Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/42216
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dc.contributor.authorHüschelrath, Kaien_US
dc.contributor.authorWeigand, Jürgenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-03T08:57:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-03T08:57:20Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/42216-
dc.description.abstractThe paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-082en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonopolisationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpredationen_US
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwVerdrängungswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePredation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot frameworken_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640254969en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10082-

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