Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/42216 
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dc.contributor.authorHüschelrath, Kaien
dc.contributor.authorWeigand, Jürgenen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-03T08:57:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-03T08:57:20Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/42216-
dc.description.abstractThe paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-082en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen
dc.subject.keywordmonopolisationen
dc.subject.keywordpredationen
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbspolitiken
dc.subject.stwVerdrängungswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePredation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640254969en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10082en

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