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dc.contributor.authorBerninghaus, Siegfried K.en
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren
dc.contributor.authorSchosser, Stephanen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-16-
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-19T10:09:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-19T10:09:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:swb:90-206282en
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.5445/IR/1000020628en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41637-
dc.description.abstractIn repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKarlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |cKarlsruheen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKIT Working Paper Series in Economics |x11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic Good Gameen
dc.subject.keywordNeighborhooden
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Analysisen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwNachbarschaftsökonomieen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleVoluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640025374en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:kitwps:11en

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