Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41637
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dc.contributor.authorBerninghaus, Siegfried K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorSchosser, Stephanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-19T10:09:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-19T10:09:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:swb:90-206282-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41637-
dc.description.abstractIn repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKIT [u.a.] |cKarlsruheen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series in economics |x11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Good Gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordNeighborhooden_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Analysisen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwNachbarschaftsökonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleVoluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental studyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640025374en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:kitwps:11-

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