Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41637
Authors: 
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.
Güth, Werner
Schosser, Stephan
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper series in economics 11
Abstract: 
In repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior.
Subjects: 
Public Good Game
Neighborhood
Cooperation
Experimental Analysis
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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