Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41574
Authors: 
Dreher, Axel
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
Vreeland, James Raymond
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion papers // CeGE 104
Abstract: 
We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council.
Subjects: 
IMF
UN Security Council
Voting
Aid
Conditionality
JEL: 
O19
O11
F35
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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