Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/41567 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 97
Verlag: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.
Schlagwörter: 
World Bank
Aid Effectiveness
Political Influence
United Nations Security Council
JEL: 
O19
O11
F35
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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