Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/41567 
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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorKlasen, Stephanen
dc.contributor.authorRaymond, Jamesen
dc.contributor.authorWerker, Ericen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23-
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T10:26:56Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-15T10:26:56Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41567-
dc.description.abstractAs is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|acege Discussion Papers |x97en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.jelO11en
dc.subject.jelF35en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWorld Banken
dc.subject.keywordAid Effectivenessen
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Influenceen
dc.subject.keywordUnited Nations Security Councilen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsprojekten
dc.subject.stwProjektbewertungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sicherheiten
dc.subject.stwMitgliedschaften
dc.subject.stwAuslandsverschuldungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleThe costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn62241495Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:97en

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