Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41439
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dc.contributor.authorDannenberg, Astriden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-04T10:49:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-04T10:49:11Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41439-
dc.description.abstractThis paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not significantly change social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the terms of an IEA alters the 'depth and breadth' of cooperation. The coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while the coalitions with majority votes implement very high effort levels but attract only few participants.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-072en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinternational environmental agreementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcooperation, votingen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVoting in international environmental agreements: Experimental evidence from the laben_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn636387585en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10072-

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