Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/41420 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 01
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier's incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers' incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier 'more on his toes' and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers' alternative options.
Schlagwörter: 
Buyer Power
Countervailing Power
Dynamic Efficiency
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-000-0
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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