Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/41419 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 06
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences - inequality aversion - using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects.
Subjects: 
behavioral economics
experimental economics
inequality aversion
otherregarding preferences
JEL: 
C72
C91
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-005-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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