Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4124
Authors: 
Siebert, Horst
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1392
Abstract: 
This paper studies the concept of an international economic order, i.e. an institutional arrangement of international rules. Such rules emerge from negative experiences – historical disasters – that inflict severe hardship on people. A taxonomy for rules reducing transaction costs is developed, for instance through decentralization of decisions, property rights, territoriality and the internalization of border-crossing negative externalities and mechanisms for global public goods. Some aspects of the rule system are studied including the process of ceding sovereignty and philosophical thoughts on international rules.
Subjects: 
Transaction costs
Welfare gains of rules
Property rights
Hierarchy of rules
Concept of order
Freiburg school
International rules
JEL: 
A12
F02
F15
K00
N00
P00
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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