Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMauleon, Anaen
dc.contributor.authorVannetelbosch, Vincenten
dc.contributor.authorVergote, Wouteren
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-11-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-29T08:56:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-29T08:56:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675-
dc.description.abstractWe adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x2008,29en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMatching Problemen
dc.subject.keywordvon Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Setsen
dc.subject.keywordFarsighted Stabilityen
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwMatchingen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleVon Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn568789318en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
249.36 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.