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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2008,25
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration.
Schlagwörter: 
Networks
R&D Collaboration
Mixed Oligopoly
JEL: 
C70
L13
L20
L31
L32
O31
D85
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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