Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40651
Authors: 
Zikos, Vasileios
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network 2008,25
Abstract: 
We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing and efficient. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. A key finding of the paper is that state-owned enterprises may be used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and collective incentives for R&D collaboration.
Subjects: 
Networks
R&D Collaboration
Mixed Oligopoly
JEL: 
C70
L13
L20
L31
L32
O31
D85
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
259.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.