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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40322
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Zaby, Alexandra K. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-01-21 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-24T14:42:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-24T14:42:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-42006 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40322 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze the strategic protection decision of an innovator between a patent and secrecy in a setting with horizontally differentiated products. By introducing the patenting decision into the well known circular city model, the impact of the disclosure requirement linked to a patent application as well as the problem of legally inventing around a patent can be taken into account. Asymmetry in the circular market leads to a consumer migration effect. We find that secrecy may be the innovator's profit maximizing strategy whenever the mandatory disclosure of information enhances the market entry of competitors. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aEberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cTübingen | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aTübinger Diskussionsbeiträge |x323 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L24 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O34 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | patenting decision | en |
dc.subject.keyword | secrecy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | disclosure requirement | en |
dc.subject.keyword | patent breadth | en |
dc.subject.keyword | horizontal product differentiation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | circular city | en |
dc.subject.stw | Innovation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Patent | en |
dc.subject.stw | Geheimhaltung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lizenzvergabe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Produktdifferenzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Räumlicher Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Oligopol | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The propensity to patent in oligopolistic markets | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 616912684 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tuedps:323 | en |
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