Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40321
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBrandes, Juliaen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchüle, Tobiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-24T14:42:27Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-24T14:42:27Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-27968en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40321-
dc.description.abstractThis paper contributes to the debate on the efficacy of IMF's catalytic finance in preventing financial crises. Extending Morris and Shin (2006), we consider that the IMF's intervention policy usually exerts a signaling effect on private creditors and that several interventions in sequence may be necessary to avert an impending crisis. Absent of the IMF's signaling ability, our results state that repeated intervention is required to bail out a country, where by additional assistance may induce moral hazard on the debtor side. Contrarily, if the IMF exerts a strong signaling effect, one single intervention suffices to avoid liquidity crises.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. |cTübingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aTübinger Diskussionsbeitrag |x310en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcatalytic financeen_US
dc.subject.keyworddebtor moral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Finanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwGläubigeren_US
dc.subject.stwAuslandsverschuldungen_US
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleIMF's assistance: Devil's kiss or guardian angel?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn558771386en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuedps:310-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
245.82 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.