Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40321 
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dc.contributor.authorBrandes, Juliaen
dc.contributor.authorSchüle, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-21-
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-24T14:42:27Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-24T14:42:27Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-27968en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40321-
dc.description.abstractThis paper contributes to the debate on the efficacy of IMF's catalytic finance in preventing financial crises. Extending Morris and Shin (2006), we consider that the IMF's intervention policy usually exerts a signaling effect on private creditors and that several interventions in sequence may be necessary to avert an impending crisis. Absent of the IMF's signaling ability, our results state that repeated intervention is required to bail out a country, where by additional assistance may induce moral hazard on the debtor side. Contrarily, if the IMF exerts a strong signaling effect, one single intervention suffices to avoid liquidity crises.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aEberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cTübingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aTübinger Diskussionsbeiträge |x310en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcatalytic financeen
dc.subject.keyworddebtor moral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Finanzierungen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwGläubigeren
dc.subject.stwAuslandsverschuldungen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleIMF's assistance: Devil's kiss or guardian angel?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558771386en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuedps:310en

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