Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/40013 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorSchumacher, Heineren
dc.contributor.authorHadnes, Myriamen
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-13T15:08:07Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-13T15:08:07Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/40013-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a theory that explains why rational agents start to believe in a causal relationship between unrelated events. Agents send and collect messages through a communication network. If they are convinced of a relationship between two events, they send messages confirming their belief with higher probability than messages contradicting it. The network aggregates this communication bias over individuals. Therefore, agents may find a strong relationship between unrelated events even if the communication bias is very small. We apply this model to an informal economy where the fear of punishment by supernatural forces prevents agents from cheating others.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 |x11en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInformal Contract Enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordCommunicationen
dc.subject.keywordLearningen
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen
dc.titleContract Enforcement by the Gods-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654222363en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec10:11en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
217.94 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.