Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39898 
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-13T14:37:26Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-13T14:37:26Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39898-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the relation between institutional quality, such as corruption, in a country and its monetary regime. It is shown that a credibly fixed exchange rate to a low inflation country, like a currency board, can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system. A monetary union, however, has ambiguous effects. I find that that there is convergence between countries with regard to the level of corruption.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Zürich 2008 |x17en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelE63en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExchange Rate Regimeen
dc.subject.keywordMonetary Policyen
dc.subject.keywordFiscal Policyen
dc.subject.keywordSeigniorageen
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordDeveloping and Transition Countriesen
dc.titleTaxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654066353en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec08:17en

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