Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39746
Authors: 
Eckardt, Martina
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Thünen-series of applied economic theory 77
Abstract: 
Insurance intermediation services are information services which exhibit strong information asymmetries. We empirically analyze whether signaling works in the German market for insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase service quality and be easily identifiable by consumers so that it pays for intermediaries to spend the related costs. By using OLS and logit estimations we test whether intermediary type, reputational activities and a variety of signaling instruments work as credible signals. Our findings confirm the main hypotheses derived from signaling theory as to the poor working of market forces in markets for information services. Accordingly, public policy regulation is necessary to mitigate the resulting problems.
Subjects: 
signaling
insurance intermediation
information services
JEL: 
D82
G22
L15
L86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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