Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39744
Autoren: 
Kuhn, Michael
Yan, Qianhui
Datum: 
2006
Reihe/Nr.: 
Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory - Working Paper 70
Zusammenfassung: 
We discuss the social welfare improvement under centralized and decentralized hierarchies and focus on supervisoris ability to monitor quality. Although the possibility of collusion against the principal is eliminated under decentralized hierarchy, the decentralization is dominating only if supervisory accuracy is large enough in the case of public information. Private information about the accuracy hurts the principal under both hierarchies. The optimal effort in hierarchy A is pooling one. The dominance of decentralization over centralization depend combination of accuracies of both the low and the high type supervisor.
Schlagwörter: 
auditing
collusion
delegation
hierarchy
quality
JEL: 
D73
D82
I18
L22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
299.38 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.