Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39640
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dc.contributor.authorBindseil, Ulrichen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:49:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:49:05Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39640-
dc.description.abstractOpen market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the bankingsystem and thereby to steer short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetarypolicy. Many central banks apply so-called “fixed rate tender” auctions in their open marketoperations. This note presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a modelof bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks facedspecifically an “under”- and an “overbidding” problem. These phenomena are revisited in thelight of the proposed model and the more general question of the optimal tender procedureand allotment policy of central banks is addressed.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZEI |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI working paper |xB 03-2004en_US
dc.subject.jelD84-
dc.subject.jelE43-
dc.subject.jelE52-
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordopen market operations-
dc.subject.keywordtender procedures-
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank liquidity management-
dc.subject.stwOffenmarktpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwZinspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionen_US
dc.subject.stwBankenliquiditäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleOver- and underbidding in central bank open market operations conducted as fixed rate tenderen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn824004736en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B032004-

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