Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39559
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dc.contributor.authorCavallari, Liliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:47:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:47:54Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39559-
dc.description.abstractBuilding on a micro-founded model of a two region-world economyin the tradition of the new open economy literature, this paperanalyses the strategic interaction of large wage-setters and the centralbank when switching from a regime of uncoordinated national monetarypolicies to a monetary union. The establishment of a monetaryunion is shown to favour wage restraint, provided the uni…ed centralbank is not too conservative. Wage discipline may reduce equilibriumin‡ation in a monetary union relative to the one under uncoordinatednational monetary policies when wage setting is centralisedacross member countries.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZEI |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI working paper |xB 11-2001en_US
dc.subject.jelE5-
dc.subject.jelF4-
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary union-
dc.subject.keywordwage bargaining-
dc.subject.keywordinflationary bias-
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwInflationen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen_US
dc.titleInflationary performance in a monetary union with large wage settersen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn824443470en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B112001-

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