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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39555
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | DiTella, Rafael | en |
dc.contributor.author | MacCulloch, Robert | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-01T09:47:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-01T09:47:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39555 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We argue that labor market institutions are endogenous. Our analysisfocuses on the government's decision to set unemployment benefits inresponse to an unemployment shock in a simple, reduced-form model ofthe labor market. It is found that the largest increases in benefits shouldoccur in economies where the adverse incentive effects of benefits arelargest. Adjustment costs of changing benefits can introduce hysteresis inbenefit setting and unemployment. Both (very) bad and good temporaryshocks (including monetary) can permanently reduce unemploymentbenefits and the unemployment rate. A desirable feature of the model isthat the mechanism yielding hysteresis (which requires a concave utilityfunction) ceases to operate when unemployment tends to one. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEI Working Paper |xB 09-2000 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J6 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Optimal unemployment benefits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hysteresis | en |
dc.subject.keyword | natural rate of unemployment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosenversicherung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Hysteresis | en |
dc.subject.stw | Optimale Besteuerung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schock | en |
dc.subject.stw | Anpassungskosten | en |
dc.title | Rational institutions yield hysteresis | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 824435494 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B092000 | en |
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