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dc.contributor.authorBrückner, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-01T09:47:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-01T09:47:40Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39543-
dc.description.abstractThe literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordinationof capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paperinvestigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy frameworkwhere taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are fiscallymore liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However,fiscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively.The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete forforeign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves thatwith standard specifications of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower taxrates than competition.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEI Working Paper |xB 22-2001en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax competitionen
dc.subject.keywordtax coordinationen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic delegationen
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragsteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren
dc.titleStrategic delegation and international capital taxation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn825506034en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B222001en

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