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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39543
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Brückner, Matthias | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-09-01T09:47:40Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-09-01T09:47:40Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39543 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordinationof capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paperinvestigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy frameworkwhere taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are fiscallymore liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However,fiscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively.The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete forforeign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves thatwith standard specifications of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower taxrates than competition. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aRheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEI Working Paper |xB 22-2001 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H2 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Tax competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tax coordination | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic delegation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kapitalertragsteuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerwettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerharmonisierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Median Voter | en |
dc.title | Strategic delegation and international capital taxation | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 825506034 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:B222001 | en |
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