Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39532 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEI Working Paper No. B 09-1999
Verlag: 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Since central banks have limited information concerning the transmission channel of monetary policy, they are faced with the difficult task of simultaneously controlling the policy target and estimating the impact of policy actions. A tradeoff between estimation and control arises because policy actions influence estimation and provide information which may improve future performance. I analyze this tradeoff in a simple model with parameter uncertainty and conduct dynamic simulations of the policymaker's decision problem in the presence of the type of uncertainties that arose in the wake of German reunification. A policy that separates learning from control may induce a persistent upward bias in money growth and inflation, just as observed after unification. In contrast, the optimal learning strategy which exploits the tradeoff between control and estimation significantly improves stabilization performance and reduces the likelihood of inflationary bias.
Schlagwörter: 
optimal control with unknown parameters
Bayesian learning
monetary policy
structural change
learning by doing
inflation targeting
JEL: 
E52
E40
D83
C44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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