Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439
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dc.contributor.authorAngerhausen, Juliaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBayer, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorHehenkamp, Burkharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31T12:14:58Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-31T12:14:58Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak. |cDortmunden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge |x06-02en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic unemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordwage bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen_US
dc.titleStrategic unemploymenten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612025799en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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