Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439 
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dc.contributor.authorAngerhausen, Juliaen
dc.contributor.authorBayer, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorHehenkamp, Burkharden
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-31T12:14:58Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-31T12:14:58Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39439-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät |cDortmunden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge |x06-02en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelJ30en
dc.subject.jelJ64en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordstrategic unemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordwage bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordminimum wageen
dc.titleStrategic unemployment-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612025799en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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