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dc.contributor.authorHorst, Ulrichen
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-16-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-26T11:57:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-26T11:57:24Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39325-
dc.description.abstractWe state conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in evolutionary models with an infinity of locally and globally interacting agents. Agents face repeated discrete choice problems. Their utility depends on the actions of some designated neighbors and the average choice throughout the whole population. We show that the dynamics on the level of aggregate behavior can be described by a deterministic measure-valued integral equation. If some form of positive complementarities prevails we establish convergence and ergodicity results for aggregate activities. We apply our convergence results to study a class of population games with random matching.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2010,012en
dc.subject.jelC63en
dc.subject.jelD50en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary dynamicsen
dc.subject.keywordsocial interactionen
dc.subject.keywordequilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordinteracting particle systemsen
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gamesen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDynamic systems of social interactions-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn623844680en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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