Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39325
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dc.contributor.authorHorst, Ulrichen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-16en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-26T11:57:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-26T11:57:24Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39325-
dc.description.abstractWe state conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in evolutionary models with an infinity of locally and globally interacting agents. Agents face repeated discrete choice problems. Their utility depends on the actions of some designated neighbors and the average choice throughout the whole population. We show that the dynamics on the level of aggregate behavior can be described by a deterministic measure-valued integral equation. If some form of positive complementarities prevails we establish convergence and ergodicity results for aggregate activities. We apply our convergence results to study a class of population games with random matching.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper |x2010,012en_US
dc.subject.jelC63en_US
dc.subject.jelD50en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary dynamicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial interactionen_US
dc.subject.keywordequilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordinteracting particle systemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gamesen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDynamic systems of social interactionsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn623844680en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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