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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39306
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Fasten, Erik R. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Hofmann, Dirk | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-04-16 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-26T11:56:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-26T11:56:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39306 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Certifiers contribute to the sound functioning of markets by reducing asymmetric information. They, however, have been heavily criticized during the 2008-09 financial crisis. This paper investigates on which side of the market a monopolistic profit-maximizing certifier offers his service. If the seller demands a rating, the certifier announces the product quality publicly, whereas if the buyer requests a rating it remains his private information. The model shows that the certifier offers his service to sellers and buyers to maximize his own profit with a higher share from the sellers. Overall, certifiers increase welfare in specific markets. Revenue shifts due to the financial crisis are also explained. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2010,007 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G24 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L15 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Certification | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Rating Agencies | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Asymmetric Information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Financial Markets | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ratingagentur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzdienstleistung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kreditwürdigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Monopol | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.title | Two-sided certification: The market for rating agencies | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 623836602 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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