Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39284
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dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Rolanden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-31en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-26T11:56:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-26T11:56:25Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39284-
dc.description.abstractI investigate the argument that, in a twoparty system with different regulatory objectives, political uncertainty generates regulatory risk. I show that this risk has a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an outputexpansion effect that benefits one party. Consequently, at least one party dislikes regulatory risk. Moreover, both political parties gain from eliminating regulatory risk when political divergence is small or the winning probability of the regulatoryriskaverse party is not too large. Because of a commitment problem, direct political bargaining is insufficient to eliminate regulatory risk. Politically independent regulatory agencies solve this commitment problem.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aSFB 649, Economic Risk |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 discussion paper |x2009,040en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordregulatory risken_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordindependent regulatory agencyen_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsbehördeen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of regulatory risken_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn607928964en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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