Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39284 
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dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Rolanden
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-31-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-26T11:56:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-26T11:56:25Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39284-
dc.description.abstractI investigate the argument that, in a twoparty system with different regulatory objectives, political uncertainty generates regulatory risk. I show that this risk has a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an outputexpansion effect that benefits one party. Consequently, at least one party dislikes regulatory risk. Moreover, both political parties gain from eliminating regulatory risk when political divergence is small or the winning probability of the regulatoryriskaverse party is not too large. Because of a commitment problem, direct political bargaining is insufficient to eliminate regulatory risk. Politically independent regulatory agencies solve this commitment problem.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2009,040en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen
dc.subject.keywordregulatory risken
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordindependent regulatory agencyen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsbehördeen
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe political economy of regulatory risk-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn607928964en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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