Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250 
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dc.contributor.authorTheuringer, Martinen
dc.contributor.authorWeiss, Piaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-25T11:28:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-25T11:28:34Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250-
dc.description.abstractWe discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD- regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität zu Köln, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik (iwp) |cKölnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIWP Discussion Paper |x2001/3en
dc.subject.jelF14en
dc.subject.jelL40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAnti-dumpingen
dc.subject.keywordabuse of market dominanceen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic firm behaviouren
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDo anti-dumping rules facilitate the abuse of market dominance?-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn378730398en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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