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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Theuringer, Martin | en |
dc.contributor.author | Weiss, Pia | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-25T11:28:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-25T11:28:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39250 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We discuss the effects of AD-protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence. In an AD-regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum-price rule in addition to existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg one, we find that AD-rules distort competition. We show that AD-protection increases the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD- regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD-protection facilitates the abuse of market dominance. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität zu Köln, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik (iwp) |cKöln | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIWP Discussion Paper |x2001/3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L40 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Anti-dumping | en |
dc.subject.keyword | abuse of market dominance | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic firm behaviour | en |
dc.subject.stw | Antidumping | en |
dc.subject.stw | Markteintritt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Marktmacht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Do anti-dumping rules facilitate the abuse of market dominance? | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 378730398 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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