Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39246
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBecker, Bettinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorTheuringer, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-25T11:28:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-25T11:28:32Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39246-
dc.description.abstractContingent Protection has grown to become an important trade restricting device. In the European Union, protection instruments like antidumping are used extensively. This paper analyses whether macroeconomic pressures may contribute to explain the variations in the intensity of antidumping protectionism in the EU. The empirical analysis uses count data models, applying various specification tests to derive the most appropriate specification. Our results suggest that the filing activity is inversely related to the macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, they confirm existing evidence for the US suggesting that domestic macroeconomic pressures are a more important determinant of contingent protection policy than external pressures.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniversität zu Köln, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik (iwp) |cKölnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIWP Discussion Paper |x2000/2en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.jelF4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAntidumpingen_US
dc.subject.keywordProtectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordMacroeconomic Conditionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEstimation of Count Data Modelsen_US
dc.subject.stwProtektionismusen_US
dc.subject.stwAntidumpingen_US
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleMacroeconomic determinants of contingent protection: The case of the European Unionen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn378699156en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
91.37 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.