Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39058
Authors: 
Baye, Michael R.
Kovenock, Dan
de Vries, Casper G.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Empirical and Theoretical Methods 3135
Abstract: 
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the 'Herodotus Paradox.'
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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