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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorKlasen, Stephanen
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden
dc.contributor.authorWerker, Ericen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-31-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:19:31Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:19:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39009-
dc.description.abstractAs is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank - are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2993en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.jelO11en
dc.subject.jelF35en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordWorld Banken
dc.subject.keywordaid effectivenessen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical influenceen
dc.subject.keywordUnited Nations Security Councilen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsprojekten
dc.subject.stwProjektbewertungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sicherheiten
dc.subject.stwMitgliedschaften
dc.subject.stwAuslandsverschuldungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleThe costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn622844709en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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