Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39000
Authors: 
Meier, Volker
Rainer, Helmut
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Labour Markets 3128
Abstract: 
We present a non-cooperative model of a family's time allocation between work and a home-produced public good, and examine whether the income tax should apply to couples or individuals. While tax-induced labor supply distortions lead to overprovision of the public good, spouses' failure to internalize the collective effect of their choices points towards underprovision. A large parameter range exists for which a move from individual to joint taxation improves the welfare of both spouses. The source of Pareto-improvement consists in moving the level of the public good closer to its first-best, while an adjustment of intra-family transfers compensates the secondary earner for the increased tax load.
Subjects: 
individual taxation
joint taxation
household production
public goods
JEL: 
D13
D62
H23
H24
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
280.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.