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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3077
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income, and on the return to educational investment. It also makes school enrollment compulsory and, if the child wage rate is sufficiently high, sets a ceiling, decreasing in parental income, on overt child labour.
Schlagwörter: 
child labour
education
uncertainty
moral hazard
JEL: 
D82
H21
H31
I28
J24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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