Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38994
Authors: 
Cigno, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Economics of Education 3077
Abstract: 
Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income, and on the return to educational investment. It also makes school enrollment compulsory and, if the child wage rate is sufficiently high, sets a ceiling, decreasing in parental income, on overt child labour.
Subjects: 
child labour
education
uncertainty
moral hazard
JEL: 
D82
H21
H31
I28
J24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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