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dc.contributor.authorRazîn, Assafen
dc.contributor.authorSadka, Efraimen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:19:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:19:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38979-
dc.description.abstractIt is often argued that tax competition may lead to a 'race to the bottom'. This result may indeed hold in the case of factor mobility (such as capital). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the'race to the bottom' hypothesis. Labor migration is governed not only by net-of-tax factor rewards, but rather importantly also by the benefits that the welfare state provides. The paper analyzes fiscal competition with and without migration in a two-country, political-economy, model with labor of different skills. The paper assigns an active fiscal role for both the host and the source countries. It models the host country stylistically as a core EU welfare state, with tax financed benefits and migration policies, and the migration source country as an accession country (following the EU enlargement to 27 states), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy. We let these two asymmetric countries (in terms of their productivity) engage in fiscal competition. Using numerical simulations we examine how the migration and tax policies are shaped, and how they are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. As the driving force behind migration is a productivity gap, we also analyze the implications of the productivity gap for the design of migration and tax policies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3075en
dc.subject.jelF22en
dc.subject.jelH20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSozialstaaten
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationale Arbeitsmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwZwei-Länder-Modellen
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staaten (Osteuropa)en
dc.titleFiscal and migration competition-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn629644675en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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