Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38961 
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dc.contributor.authorBiran, Omeren
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoiseen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-17-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38961-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3067en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen
dc.subject.keywordBayesian gameen
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.keywordcoreen
dc.subject.keywordpartition function gameen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwBayes-Statistiken
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCore-stable rings in auctions with independent private values-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn629488525en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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