Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38961
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dc.contributor.authorBiran, Omeren_US
dc.contributor.authorForges, Françoiseen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38961-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper Industrial Organisation |x3067en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordauctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordBayesian gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoreen_US
dc.subject.keywordpartition function gameen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwBayes-Statistiken_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCore-stable rings in auctions with independent private valuesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn629488525en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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