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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3068
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent debates have suggested that taxation is very detrimental to labour force participation and employment. However, some countries - notably the Scandinavian - stand out as contradictions to this view since they have managed to sustain high labour force participation rate despite high tax rates and a generous social safety net. This either refutes the standard incentive argument or leave the Scandinavian countries as a puzzle. This paper argues that both the standard view and the Scandinavian experience can be reconciled when taking into account both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives build into the social safety net. The social safety net in the Scandinavian countries is at the same time both generous and employment conditioned. It is shown that these conditionalities can make high labour force participation consistent with a high marginal effective taxation of labour, and that it on the margin lowers the marginal costs of public funds. Such employment conditionalities make it possible to achieve distributional objectives without jeopardizing the incentive structure.
Schlagwörter: 
tax incentives
labour supply
activation
JEL: 
J01
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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