Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38935
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dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Bården_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:22Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38935-
dc.description.abstractIf a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right to exploit fossil fuel deposits, I show that these problems vanish and the first best is implemented. When the market for deposits clears, the coalition relies entirely on supply-side policies, which is simple to implement in practice. The result illustrates that efficiency can be obtained without Coasian negotiations ex post, if key inputs are tradable ex ante.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper Energy and Climate Economics |x2992en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelF55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoaseen_US
dc.subject.keywordclimate changeen_US
dc.subject.keywordcarbon leakageen_US
dc.subject.keywordsupply vs. demand side policiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrade policiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordthe green paradoxen_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental agreementsen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrieverlagerungen_US
dc.subject.stwFossiler Energieträgeren_US
dc.subject.stwErdölkonzessionen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Handelspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwZeitkonsistenzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBuy coal! Deposit markets prevent carbon leakageen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn622656392en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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