Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38925 
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dc.contributor.authorChirinko, Robert S.en
dc.contributor.authorWilson, Daniel J.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-20-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:16Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:16Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38925-
dc.description.abstractThe standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses. This extension to the standard strategic tax competition model implies that business contributions may affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates but also the slope of the tax reaction function between jurisdictions, thus enhancing or retarding the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. The model is estimated with panel data for 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions. Among other results, we document a significant direct effect of business contributions on tax policy; the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is approximately $6.65.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3121en
dc.subject.jelH70en
dc.subject.jelH25en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbusiness campaign contributionsen
dc.subject.keywordstate business tax policyen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordcapital mobilityen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten
dc.subject.stwKapitalmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleCan lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among US States-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn631387730en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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