Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38889 
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dc.contributor.authorvan der Ploeg, Fredericken
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-18-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:17:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:17:54Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38889-
dc.description.abstractFor a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. The theory suggests that adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2981en
dc.subject.jelE20en
dc.subject.jelF32en
dc.subject.jelO13en
dc.subject.jelQ01en
dc.subject.jelQ32en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexhaustible resourcesen
dc.subject.keywordHotelling ruleen
dc.subject.keywordHartwick ruleen
dc.subject.keywordcapitalen
dc.subject.keywordsustainable consumptionen
dc.subject.keywordfractionalizationen
dc.subject.keywordseepageen
dc.subject.keywordinsecure property rightsen
dc.subject.keyworddifferential gameen
dc.subject.keywordgenuine savingen
dc.subject.keywordadjusted net savingen
dc.subject.stwRessourcenökonomiken
dc.subject.stwRohstoffressourcenen
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwHotelling-Regelen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRapacious resource depletion, excessive investment and insecure property rights-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn621466638en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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