Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38880 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-10-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:54Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38880-
dc.description.abstractThe Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (1993) that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty's critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,14en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Income Taxationen
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the optimality of optimal income taxation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn625804074en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
520.64 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.