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dc.contributor.authorLang, Matthiasen
dc.contributor.authorWambach, Achimen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:51Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38877-
dc.description.abstractMost insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy, as the credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports might act as a powerful deterrent. We show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addition, the auditing costs of the insurers are heterogeneous, it can be optimal not to commit, because committing to a fraud detection strategy eliminates the ambiguity. Thus strategic ambiguity can be an equilibrium outcome in the market and competition does not force firms to provide the relevant information. This finding is also relevant in other auditing settings and complements the literature on games with ambiguity-averse players.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,24en
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52303en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelK4en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFrauden
dc.subject.keywordCommitmenten
dc.subject.keywordAmbiguityen
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordCostly State Verificationen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsbetrugen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe fog of fraud: Mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn627601650en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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