Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38876 
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dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, Kristoffelen
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorThöni, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-15-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:47Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38876-
dc.description.abstractUnder a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate, when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public good provision shows that the option to punish others substantially improves cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with 'reasonable doubt' about others' contributions. Interestingly, people reveal a high willingness to punish even if their information about cooperation rates is inaccurate, or noisy. If there is some non-trivial degree of noise, punishment (1) cannot maintain high contributions and (2) reduces welfare even below the level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is crucial for he efficiency of sanction mechanisms. If a situation is characterized by low information accuracy, precluding sanctions can be optimal.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,11en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelK14en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Law & Economicsen
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen
dc.subject.keywordEnforcement under Uncertaintyen
dc.subject.stwStrafeen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titlePunishment despite reasonable doubt: A public goods experiment with uncertainty over contributions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn62372426Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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