Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38874
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Albanese, Giuseppe | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sorge, Marco M. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-06-09 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-18T11:11:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-18T11:11:46Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38874 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker - and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task - with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H49 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H77 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Illegal lobbying | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Endogenous policy making | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Judicial control | en |
dc.subject.stw | Justiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rechtsdurchsetzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Korruption | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The role of the judiciary in the public decision making process | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 627600794 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.