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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2010,15
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, managers will collude with large shareholders by means of settlements or bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to conventional agency models, we find that large shareholders do not monitor the management; as a consequence, there is no free riding opportunity for small shareholders.
Schlagwörter: 
Derivative Shareholder Suits
Percentage Limits
Collusion
Monitoring
Free Riding
JEL: 
K22
K42
G30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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