Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Beckmann, Klaus
Gerrits, Carsten
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapier // Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre 83
We consider an argument that it might be helpful to combat poverty in developing countries indirectly by enlisting firms' help (as corporate citizens) in reducing corruption. It turns out that this argument crucially depends on a fair number of presmises, including (a) a common interest of firms in reducing bribes, (b) the absence of positive effects of corruption on society at large and (c) the cost-effectiveness of formal institutions designed to combat corruption. In all three regards, we explain a number of reservations, both theoretical and empirical. Some tentative institutional policy recommendations ensue.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
646.59 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.